ABSTRACT. This paper introduces a multisector model of commodity markets with storage, where equilibrium is defined by profit maximization, arbitrage and market clearing conditions. We then solve for the decentralized equilibrium via a corresponding dynamic program. We also describe the dynamics of the model, establishing geometric ergodicity, a Law of Large Numbers and a Central Limit Theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: C61, C62
INTRODUCTION
Given their volatility and importance to politically sensitive coalitions, markets for primary commodities have often attracted intervention by governments aimed at stabilizing producer incomes. Ideally, manipulation of endogenously determined variables requires careful analysis of the equilibrium process. For this and other reasons economists have been motivated to construct models which replicate the key features of primary commodity markets.
Perhaps the most successful attempt to frame such a model is found in the seminal work of Samuelson (1971) and Schectman and Scheinkman (1983) . These analyses combine profit maximization, arbitrage conditions and market clearing to derive a complete system of equilibrium prices and quantities in markets which feature stochastic supply and speculative investment.
Given their simple arbitrage-based restrictions and endogenous determination of consumption, speculative investment and price, these commodity pricing model provide an attractive framework for empirical analysis. They have formed the basis for a growing number of quantitative studies, including Laroque (1992, 1996) , Chambers and Bailey (1996) and Ng and Ruge-Murcia (2000) . This paper we introduce a multisector model of commodity prices in the spirit of Samuelson (1971) and Schectman and Scheinkman (1983) . Our motivation is to provide the theoretical foundations for models which replicate commodity markets more closely by taking into account the joint determination of prices and quantities across related commodities. A multisector approach can potentially accommodate the impact of demand and supply conditions for one commodity on the price and quantity observed in the market for another.
Prices and quantities of related commodities are jointly determined because of contemporaneously correlated shocks on the supply side and substitutability or complementarity on the demand side. For example, the markets for grains such as corn, sorghum, oats, wheat and barley are have traditionally been closely integrated, as suggested by the scatter plot matrix for prices over the period from January 1994 to July 2007 shown in Figure 1 . 2 Altered supply or demand conditions for one grain impact strongly on prices for other grains, in this case due mainly to substitutability of feed grains (as a function of energy content). 3 The fact that a multisector equilibrium commodity pricing model has not been developed to date appears largely due to technical difficulties. While the one-sector model has proven to be highly tractable, 2 The data are monthly average prices in the US over the stated period. Source:
Agriculture Statistics Board. 3 It has also been argued that the prices of seemingly unrelated commodities are correlated even after controlling for relevant macroeconomic variables (Pindyck and Rotemburg, 1990 ). Our model is not suitable for addressing this issue as we envisage relationships between the commodities on either the demand or supply side. Without such relationships our M-sector model reduces to M decoupled one-sector models. 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5CornWheat FIGURE 1. Price Correlations, Grains the multisector model is considerably less so. For example, in the one-sector model interiority and first order conditions are straightforward, investment is monotone in quantity, and the state variable (supply) follows a renewal process which guarantees stationarity and ergodicity. In the multisector case none of these features remain, and analysis is correspondingly more difficult.
In this paper we show that despite these difficulties a multisector model can be successfully developed and analyzed. We frame a market with M commodities and define equilibrium prices and quantities via profit maximization, arbitrage and market clearing conditions. We then introduce a planner's problem, the first order conditions for which yield the arbitrage conditions of the decentralized market. The decentralized equilibrium can then be computed via dynamic programming techniques.
In the dynamic program, we have treated an unbounded reward problem via weighted supremum norms. Thus we require neither bounded rewards-which excludes common parametric formulationsnor bounded shocks. Bounded shocks are a standard technique used to compactify the state space and thereby bound rewards, but have the disadvantage of excluding many shock distributions used routinely in econometrics. We avoid placing additional assumptions on rewards and shocks by careful choice of the weighting function.
(For example, we do not require the homogeneity conditions used in Boyd (1990) and Alvarez and Stokey (1998) .)
Our other results concern dynamics of the state process. Establishing global stability (ergodicity) is considerably more complicated than in the one-sector model, where policies are monotone and the state follows a renewal process. 4 Using an alternative approach, we are able to provide simple conditions under which the equilibrium process for the stock is asymptotically stationary and geometrically ergodic. 1.1. Outline. The next section introduces a multisector commodity pricing model and defines the competitive equilibrium. Section 3 sets up a corresponding dynamic program, and establishes the connection between this programming problem and the decentralized equilibrium. Section 4 considers dynamics under the equilibrium. Section 5 concludes, and any remaining proofs are given in the appendix. 4 The dynamics of the single sector commodity pricing model were investigated in detail by Scheinkman and Schectman (1983) . Confirming a conjecture of Samuelson (1971) , they show that the process for the state (the stock of the commodity) converges asymptotically to a unique stationary distribution. Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth and Wright (2002) established geometric ergodicity and investigated other properties of the stationary distribution.
SPECULATIVE PRICES
In this section we construct a multisector version of Samuelson's commodity pricing model. In subsequent sections we show that equilibrium storage by speculators in the decentralized market is equal to the optimal investment policy of a planner maximizing an discounted revenue stream for the final producers.
In what follows,
is all z with x z y, and so on. Let ∂R M + be the boundary
The inner product of x and y is denoted x, y , and x := x, x 1/2 is the Euclidean norm. For g : R M → R, the symbol ∇g denotes the vector of partial derivatives when it exists, and D h g(x) is the directional derivative of g at x in the direction h:
We use λ to denote Lebesgue measure on R M + , while B(R M + ) is the Borel sets and L 1 (R M + ) is the Lebesgue integrable functions. A distribution is a Borel probability measure on R M + .
The market has M commodities, the vector of spot prices for which is given at time t by p t = (p m t ) M m=1 ∈ R M + . Demand for the commodities comes from firms (final producers), who use the commodities as inputs to their production process, and from speculators, who purchase the commodities for future sale. Let the risk-free interest rate r be constant, and set ρ := (1 + r) −1 .
The firms demand a vector C t of the commodities according to the profit maximization problem
where F(c) is the output of the final good given input vector c, and the price of the final good has been normalized to one. Assumption 2.1. The production function F : R M + → R + is strictly concave, strictly increasing, continuous and differentiable on R M ++ , with F(0) = 0. 5 In addition, for our analysis to succeed we require that that equilibrium demand is strictly positive in each period. In the multisector case obtaining conditions on the primitives of the model under which this property holds is a nontrivial problem. We show that the following condition is sufficient.
Assumption 2.2.
For any c on the boundary of R + M and any vector h which points to the interior, the directional derivative at c in the direction h is infinite. That is, + and any h ∈ R M with x := c + h ∈ R M ++ . Since F(c) = 0 we have
Since x 0 we have F(x) > 0, and as a < 1 the right hand side converges to infinity when θ ↓ 0.
Aside from firms, there exists a unit mass of identical speculators who are able to store the commodities between periods. Purchasing I m units of good m yields α m I m units next period, where α m ∈ (0, 1) parameterizes storage cost, or depreciation. Hence I t = (I m t ) M m=1 ∈ R M + carried over from time t yields ΛI t at t + 1, where
Aggregate supply X t in the market at time t is the sum of ΛI t−1 and a "harvest" W t :
Regarding the harvest process we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2.3. The shocks (W t ) t≥1 are independent, identically distributed R M + -valued random vectors with common distribution φ. In addition, φ(R M ++ ) = 1 and
The assumption that φ(R M ++ ) = 1 implies that X t lies in R M ++ for all t with probability one, in which case we need not concern ourselves with infinite prices on the boundary ∂R M + . The sequence of shocks (W t ) t≥1 is defined on an arbitrary probability space (Ω, F , P), 6 and E denotes expectation with respect to P.
To construct a competitive equilibrium for the commodity market we consider demand, investment and pricing functions c, i and p from R M ++ → R M + which determine firm demand, speculative investment and spot price respectively. Given c, i and p, the process for quantities and prices evolves according to
For this system of functions to be an equilibrium requires market clearing and profit maximization, or
for x ∈ R M ++ . In addition, we introduce the following arbitrage condition. Given x ∈ R M + and investment policy i, we say that h ∈ R M 6 Thus,
The set of all feasible variations at x is denoted F i v (x). Assuming speculators are risk neutral, nonexistence of arbitrage requires that i and p satisfy
If the condition (4) fails for some x then a deviation from i(x) in the feasible direction h yields strictly positive expected profits for speculators, and hence is not an equilibrium.
THE PLANNER'S PROBLEM
In order to construct a set of prices and quantities which satisfy (3) and (4) we introduce a planning problem, the optimal policy for which generates the decentralized equilibrium. The planning problem can be stated as
where F, ρ, (W t ) t≥1 and Λ are as defined in Section 2, and I denotes the set of investment policies i : R M + → R M + that are Borel measurable and satisfy the feasibility constraint i(x) ≤ x.
3.1. Maximization of the Surplus. The planning problem (5)- (6) involves maximization of the firm's discounted revenue stream. 7 Before demonstrating that the solution to the planner's problem yields the decentralized equilibrium, we provide some intuition as to why maximizing the firm's discounted revenue stream yields the decentralized equilibrium. In particular, we show that (5)- (6) is the natural objective for the planner, as it is operationally equivalent to maximizing total surplus in the market.
Total surplus is the sum of discounted firm profits, payments to the sellers of the commodities and returns to speculative investors:
To see that maximization of this surplus subject to the constraints
is equivalent to (5)- (6), note that optimal paths satisfy X t = I t + C t for all t ≥ 0, from which we obtain I t + C t = ΛI t−1 + W t , and hence
Substituting back into the objective function, for each T ∈ N the sum is
Since X 0 = W 0 we have C 0 + I 0 = W 0 , and hence
Taking the limit with respect to T, this becomes ∑ t≥0 ρ t F(C t ). Hence the surplus maximization problem reduces to (5).
3.2.
Solving the Planning Problem. Let v be the value function associated with (5)- (6) . That is,
Here (X t ) t≥0 obeys the recursion in (6), but with X 0 = x. We call i ∈ I optimal if it attains the supremum in (7) for every x ∈ R M + .
Since F and the state variable are potentially unbounded on R M + , it is not immediately clear that the expectations expressions in (5) and (7) exist in R. We use a weighted norm approach to establish existence of the value function and the validity of the Bellman equation. 8 To construct the weight function, consider the R M + -valued process
and the function κ : R M + → R defined by the infinite sum
where δ is any constant in (ρ, 1).
Lemma 3.1. The function κ is finite, increasing and continuous everywhere on R M + . For any i ∈ I we have v i ≤ κ on R M + . As a result, the value function v is well-defined, and the ratio v/κ is bounded.
We call w : R M + → R κ-bounded if w/κ is bounded; that is, if
The function w → w κ is a norm on the set of all κ-bounded functions on R M + . Define b κ BR M + to be the set of κ-bounded Borel measurable function on R M + , and b κ cR M + to be those functions which are in addition continuous. The collection of functions b κ BR M + endowed with the norm · κ is a Banach space. Using continuity of κ, it can be shown that
The Bellman operator T :
The operator T is a contraction of modulus γ := ρ/δ < 1 on b κ BR M + with respect to the · κ -norm:
Proposition 3.1. T is a well-defined map from b κ BR M + to itself, and
If w is continuous then so is Tw, and hence T sends b κ cR M + into itself.
We can now give Bellman's equation for the value function, and the resulting characterization of the optimal policy. + we have T n w − v κ → 0 as n → ∞. In addition, v is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave on R M + . A unique optimal policy I ∈ I exists. It is continuous, and satisfies Figure 2 shows (an approximation to) the value function for the two commodity case, where α 1 = α 2 = ρ = 0.9, F(x, y) = x 0.4 y 0.4 and W = (e ξ , e η ) with (ξ, η) independent standard normal. The approximation was carried out by iterating the Bellman operator, starting at F ∈ b κ cR M + . The sequence converges to v at rate O(γ n ).
9
Next we obtain additional properties of the optimal policy via first order and envelope conditions: 9 Each iterate was approximated using a continuous piecewise affine function constructed as the infimum of 324 supporting hyperplanes. This technique is related to the method proposed by Santos and Vigo (1998), who suggest approximating value functions by continuous piecewise affine functions. (Our algorithm for constructing this approximation is somewhat different.)
FIGURE 2. Value Function

Proposition 3.2.
Under the stated assumptions demand is interior, in the sense that if x 0 then x − I(x) 0. In addition, the value function v is differentiable on R M ++ and
Figures 3 gives the optimal investment policy functions I 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and I 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) at top and bottom respectively. The are obtained by solving (10) , with v the approximate value function given in Figure 2 . The parameters are the same as above: α = ρ = 0.9, F(x, y) = x 0.4 y 0. 4 and W = (e ξ , e η ) with (ξ, η) independent standard normal.
The Decentralized Equilibrium.
We are now ready to connect the equilibrium for the decentralized commodity market defined in Section 2 with the planners problem. To do so, notice that if one choses i : R M ++ → R M + with i(x) ∈ [0, x) for all x, then for competitive equilibrium to obtain the consumption and price functions c and p are completely determined on R M ++ by i via the two equations in (3). As a result, to determine competitive equilibria we can focus on the investment function alone. This leads to the following definition. 
++ is said to be a competitive equilibrium investment function for the commodity market if the induced pricing function p(x) := ∇F(x − i(x)) satisfies (4).
Our main result can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 3.2.
The optimal investment policy I defined in Theorem 3.1 is a competitive equilibrium investment function for the commodity market.
Moreover, it is unique in the sense that if i is a competitive equilibrium investment function then i = I on R M ++ .
Proof. We begin with a definition: Let f x be the concave function
Now we establish that I defined in Theorem 3.1 is a competitive equilibrium investment function in the sense that the induced pricing function P(x) := ∇F(x − I(x)) satisfies
for all x ∈ R M ++ . To see this, fix x ∈ R M ++ and h ∈ F I v (x), so that
Using P(x) = ∇v(x) = ∇F(x − I(x)) we obtain (13) . Thus I is a competitive equilibrium investment function.
Next we consider uniqueness. Since f x is strictly concave its maximizer I(x) is unique for all x. Since the first order condition (12) is necessary and sufficient, it follows that I it the unique function that satisfies (12) for all x. Writing this directional derivative in terms of I we see that I is the only function which satisfies
Now suppose that i is a competitive equilibrium investment function, so in particular p(x) = ∇F(x − i(x)) satisfies (4). Then
for all x ∈ R M ++ . But we have just established that I is the only function which has this property. Hence i = I.
DYNAMICS
Next we turn to equilibrium dynamics of supply (X t ) t≥0 given the optimal investment policy I defined in (10) . The process is Markovian and obeys the stochastic recursive sequence
The sequence (X t ) t≥0 can also be seen as the equilibrium time path given in (2), as discussed in Section 2.
Throughout this section we maintain Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3. Assumption 2.2 is not required. Instead, additional restrictions on the nature of the shock distribution are necessary:
Assumption 4.1. The distribution φ of the shock W can be represented by a density, which we again denote by φ. The density φ is continuous everywhere on R M + and positive on its interior.
Many standard distributions satisfy all of our assumptions, a useful example being the multivariate lognormal density. Heavy tailed densities are also possible, provided that µ in (1) remains finite. It would appear that the latter assumption is difficult to weaken substantially while maintaining our stability results. 10 10 The assumption that φ is a density can perhaps be relaxed without losing the stability results given below. However, the density assumption is suitable for empirical applications and allows slightly more direct proofs, as well as a more explicit construction of the Markov process generated by the optimal policy.
The dynamics in (14) can be encapsulated in the Markov density kernel
Intuitively, q(x, y) is the conditional density of X t+1 when X t = x.
11
If y ΛI(x) then y − ΛI(x) / ∈ R M + and φ(y − ΛI(x)) is not defined. For such values of x and y we take q(x, y) = 0. Alternatively, one can regard φ as defined on all of R M and equal to zero on R M \ R M + .
Using standard arguments 12 we can deduce that if X t has any distribution ψ t (not necessarily a density), then X t+1 has a distribution represented by density ψ t+1 , where
Let M be a map from the set of distributions on R M + into the set of densities on R M + defined by ψ → ψM,
This map is called the Markov operator corresponding to q. 13 In light of (16), the marginal distributions (ψ t ) of (X t ) satisfy ψ t+1 = ψ t M. Iterating backwards we obtain ψ t = ψ 0 M t , where M t is the t-th composition of M with itself, and, as above, ψ 0 is the distribution of X 0 .
A distribution ψ * on R M + is called stationary for the optimal process (14) if ψ * is a fixed point of M. The interpretation is that if X t ∼ ψ * , then X t+1 ∼ ψ * M = ψ * , and hence probabilities are unchanged. Since M maps distributions into densities, any fixed point ψ * of M must be a density (because ψ * is the image of itself under M). Hence 11 To see this, observe that for any B ∈ B(R M + ) the change of variable z = y − in what follows we need concern ourselves only with stationary densities, rather than stationary distributions. For such a stationary density, the defining condition ψ * M = ψ * translates to
We measure the distance between densities φ and φ according to their deviation with respect to the norm on L 1 (R M + ):
By Scheffè's Identity, we also have
Here the supremum is with respect to all Borel measurable bounded functions with supremum norm less than 1.
14 To state our results, we introduce two classes H 1 and H 2 of Borel measurable, real-valued functions on R M + . Let s be any arbitrary but fixed constant in [1, ∞). The first class H 1 is those functions h satisfying
The second class H 2 ⊂ H 1 is those functions h satisfying
We now come to the main stability result of the paper. (1) The optimal process (14) has a unique stationary density ψ * .
(2) The stationary density ψ * satisfies x ψ * (dx) < ∞. In particular, the steady state expected value in each sector is finite.
(3) If ψ 0 is any distribution with x ψ 0 (dx) < ∞, then there is an M < ∞ and a β < 1 such that, ∀t ∈ N,
We present several corollaries to the theorem:
Corollary 4.1. Let (X t ) t≥0 be the optimal process starting at x 0 ∈ R M + . For any such x 0 , the density ψ t of X t converges in L 1 (R M + ) to ψ * at a geometric rate.
For the next corollary some additional notation is useful. Let (X * t ) t≥0 be a stationary version of the process. That is, X * t+1 = ΛI(X * t ) + W t+1 and X * 0 ∼ ψ * . Now fix h ∈ H 1 and consider the constants
Corollary 4.2. Let ψ 0 be an arbitrary in initial condition and let (X t ) t≥0 be the process starting at X 0 ∼ ψ 0 . If h ∈ H 1 , then m * h is finite, and
If, in addition, h ∈ H 2 , then v * h is finite, and
The two most important consequences of Corollary 4.2 are as follows. First, for any event B ∈ B(R M + ) we have
, and hence the steady state probability ψ * (B) is approximately equal to the fraction of time that the equilibrium quantity spends in B as the time horizon tends to infinity. This is the standard concept of ergodicity. Second, expectations and probabilities vis-a-vis the stationary distribution can be computed by simulation, appealing (LLN). For such calculations, (CLT) provides (asymptotic) error bounds. q(X t , y) → q(x, y)ψ * (x)dx P-a.s. as n → ∞ By (18), the right hand side is precisely ψ * (y), so ψ * n (y) → ψ * (y) almost surely for all y. Figure 4 displays an instance of ψ * n for the same parameters as in Figure 2 , where n = 2000.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a multisector commodity pricing model and described the competitive equilibrium. We indicated how one can solve for equilibrium prices and quantities via a corresponding dynamic program. We also showed that the equilibrium state process is stationary and geometrically ergodic. This sets out a cohesive framework for future empirical analysis.
A number of extensions to our model can be considered. One is to include stochastic demand on the part of firms driven by shocks to production and output prices. Another is correlated shocks for the harvest processes. In terms of the dynamics, the impact of correlated shocks is unclear. While establishing the existence of a stationary distribution should be possible via continuity arguments, stability is highly problematic given the lack of monotonicity and the obvious problems in establishing irreducibility. Such topics are left for future research.
APPENDIX
This section collects all remaining proofs. Throughout the proofs we adopt the new notation α := max 1≤m≤M α m . As the largest eigenvalue, α is the spectral radius of Λ, and hence Λx ≤ α x , ∀x ∈ R M . 6.1. Optimality. Our first task is to prove Lemma 3.1. Recall our definition of the auxillary process
From this expression one can verify the claim in Lemma 3.1 that κ is finite, increasing and continuous. Indeed, since F is concave there exist positive constants b 0 and b 1 such that
+ . Moreover, the matrix norm of Λ is just α = max 1≤m≤M α m < 1; and hence Λ k z ≤ α k z for any z ∈ R M . Consequently,
Given this bound the finiteness of κ(
The assertion that κ is increasing follows from monotonicity of F. Continuity of κ follows from continuity of F and the Dominated Convergence Theorem.
The remainder of the proof of Lemma 3.1 is straightforward. Since F is increasing and X t − i(X t ) ≤ X t ≤ Y t pointwise on Ω for any i ∈ I we have v i ≤ κ. Since v(x) is defined as sup i∈I v i (x) and since v i (x) ≤ κ(x) for every i ∈ I the function v exists and is dominated by κ. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Next we turn to the proof of Proposition 3.1. For this proof some extra notation is useful. In particular, for any appropriately integrable function h on R M + we define the new function Nh by
so that Nh(x) is the expectation of h(Y t ) given Y t−1 = x. 15 Evidently h ≤ h implies Nh ≤ Nh , and N1 = 1. We let N t be the t-th iterate, in which case
for all t, and we can express κ as
To prove that T is well-defined and contracting on b κ BR M + we need Lemma 6.1. For any x ∈ R M + the weight function κ satisfies
Proof. Pick any x ∈ R M + . Since κ is increasing,
But from the definitions and the Dominated Convergence Theorem,
This last expression is just (1/δ)κ(x), and the proof is done.
Using Lemma 6.1 we can show that the Bellman operator T does send b κ BR M + into itself-in particular, Tw is κ-bounded whenever w is. Indeed, for any w ∈ b κ BR M + we have
Thus Tw is κ-bounded, as was to be shown.
In order to prove that T is a contraction of modulus γ = ρ/δ we use the following extention of Blackwell's sufficient condition, which is proved in Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (1999, Proposition 7.2.9).
Lemma 6.2. If T is monotone and, for any c ∈ R + and w
By monotonicity is meant that for any pair w, w ∈ b κ BR M + with w ≤ w we have Tw ≤ Tw . This property is easily shown and the proof is omitted. To verify (20) , observe that
In light of Lemma 6.1 we have
Since γ = ρ/δ the proof is complete.
The only claim in Proposition 3.1 that remains to be verified is that T maps the set of continuous κ-bounded functions b κ cR M + into itself. In particular, we need to check that if w is continuous κ-bounded then Tw is continuous. To see this, pick any such w. In view of Berge's Theorem of the Maximum, the function
will be continuous provided that
In view of continuity of w and the Dominated Convergence Theorem, it is sufficient to show that |w(Λξ n + z)| is dominated pointwise by some integrable function for all n. But if x is any vector with ξ n ≤ x for all n, then for any n ∈ N and any z ∈ R M + we have
The integral of the right hand side is finite by Lemma 6.1. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Next we prove Theorem 3.1. Since T is a · κ -contraction on the Banach space b κ BR M + it follows that T has a unique fixed pointw ∈ b κ BR M + and T n w −w κ → 0 as n → ∞ for any w ∈ b κ BR M + . Moreover,w ∈ b κ cR M + and is therefore continuous, as b κ cR M + is a closed subset of b κ BR M + on which T is invariant. The proof thatw is in fact equal to the value function v is almost identical to the standard argument (i.e., the argument for bounded rewards) and is omitted.
Existence of a maximizer I(x) for each x follows from continuity of the objective and compactness of the constraint. Continuity of I follows from Berge's Theorem of the Maximum. That v is strictly increasing and strictly concave can be proved by a small modification of the usual technique. 
There is no difficulty in checking that g is well-defined and concave on (−∞, x]. It follows that
θ is well-defined and (by concavity) decreasing on (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]. As a result, the limit lim θ↓0 h(θ) exists and is finite. 17 Now since c is optimal, and since the alternative c + θd is less than x and therefore feasible at x for θ ∈ (0, 1], we must have
Using the function g this can be rewritten as
Rearranging and dividing through by θ gives 16 It is easy to show that T maps the set C of increasing concave functions in
Moreover, a simple argument shows that · κ -convergence implies pointwise convergence, which in turn preserves monotonicity and concavity. Hence C is · κ -closed. As T : C → C and C is · κ -closed we have v ∈ C . Finally, T maps elements of C into strictly increasing, strictly concave functions in C , so v is strictly increasing and strictly concave (because Tv = v). 17 The value h(θ) increases monotonically as θ ↓ 0 and is bounded by h(−1).
The left hand side diverges to infinity as θ ↓ 0, while the right hand side converges to a finite constant. This contradicts our assuption that c ∈ ∂R M + , and we conclude that c = x − I(x) 0.
To complete the proof of Proposition 3.2 we show that v is differentiable on R M ++ and satisfies the envelope condition ∇v(x) = ∇F(x − I(x)). We use the well-known techniques developed by Mirman and Zilcha (1975) and Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979, Lemma 1) . In particular, if x ∈ R M ++ and w is any concave differentiable function defined on a neighborhood N of x and satisfying w(x) = v(x) and w(y) ≤ v(y) for all y ∈ N, then v is differentiable at x and ∇v(x) = ∇w(x).
Although investment is not interior, the interiority of demand is sufficient for this technique to work. To see this, pick any 
Note that w is well-defined on N, as i 0 ≤ x for all x ∈ N. In addition, for each x ∈ N investment i 0 is feasible, so
Evidently w is concave and v(x 0 ) = w(x 0 ). Finally, w is differentiable at x 0 with ∇w(x 0 ) = ∇F(x 0 − I(x 0 )). Hence ∇v(x 0 ) = ∇F(x 0 − I(x 0 )).
6.2.
Dynamics. Now we turn to dynamics with a view to proving Theorem 4.1. Recall the definition of q in (15) . With respect to this q we define q-small sets, aperiodicity and irreducibility.
18
By nontrivial is meant that g is not the zero element in L 1 (R M + ). If such set C exists for q, and, moreover, C g > 0, then the optimal process (X t ) is called aperiodic. 19 18 See Meyn and Tweedie (1993) for more details on these concepts. 19 Our definitions of small sets and aperiodicity are slightly stronger than the standard definitions. See Meyn and Tweedie (1993, Chapter 5). φ(y − ΛI(x))dy > 0 Hence X t ∈ (0, a1] implies X t+1 ∈ B with positive probability.
Lemma 6.4.
There is an n ≥ 0 such that P{X n ∈ (0, a1]} > 0, where (X t ) is the process starting at x 0 .
Proof. Let x ∞ := max 1≤m≤M x m for any x = (x m ) M m=1 ∈ R M + . Note that Λx ∞ ≤ α x ∞ holds for any x. Note also that · ∞ is consistent with the ordering on R M + , in the sense that x ≤ y implies x ∞ ≤ y ∞ .
Since a > 0 and α < 1, clearly we can choose an n ≥ 0 and a z 0 0 such that
Let E be the event ∩ t≤n {W t ≤ z 0 }. Evidently E has positive probability, so it suffices to prove that X n ≤ a1 on E. To this end, observe that on E we have X t ≤ ΛX t−1 + z 0 , t = 1, . . . , n
The proof of Lemma 6.4 is now complete.
It remains to complete the proof of Proposition 6.1. Clearly the process is irreducible if we can show that P{X n+1 ∈ B} > 0, where n is defined in Lemma 6.4. But this must be so, because Since φ(z) > 0 whenever z 0, it follows that φ(y − ΛI(x)) > 0. Combining this observation with the compactness of K and the continuity of φ, it follows that := min{φ(y − ΛI(x)) : (x, y) ∈ K} exists and is strictly positive.
Let g := 1 [α c,c] . Since > 0, c 0 and α < 1, the function g is nontrivial.
We claim that g satisfies (21) . To see this, pick any x ∈ C. If y / ∈ [α c, c] then g(y) = 0, and (21) Either way we have q(x, y) = φ(y − ΛI(x)) ≥ g(y) as claimed.
Lemma 6.6. The optimal process (X t ) is aperiodic.
Proof. Let C and g be as in the proof of Lemma 6.5. Evidently for some β ∈ (0, 1). Since H 1 contains all Borel measurable real-valued functions h with |h| ≤ 1, it follows from (19) that d 1 (ψ t , ψ * ) = O(β t ).
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Since (X t ) t≥0 has been shown to be V-uniformly ergodic, both the LLN and the CLT results are immediate from Meyn and Tweedie (1993, Theorem 17.0.1).
